“There are no records responsive to your request,” states a Freedom of Information Act denial letter from the Department of the Navy.
Yet the report surely had existed at one time. The document was referenced by a source associated with the CDC in 1996.
It remains unclear if the report has been lost amidst boxes of paperwork never catalogued or digitized or if it was outright destroyed pursuant to federal law.
Despite the report simply vanishing, a small fragment of its contents has survived through the source that cited it (Fields, 1996).
The 1992 Navy report by C. McCann, titled, Observations of US Navy Influenza Campaign with Ped-O-Jet Injectors, from Bremerton Naval Base documented the mass inoculations of military personnel with Ped-O-Jet injectors and also recommended one known specification for industry standards.
The Navy’s recommendation requested that the percent of bleeders following Ped-O-Jet injections be “5% or less within 2 seconds” of an injection. This specification is known as the bleeding rate and was once used an evaluation marker to deem what was an acceptable amount of bleeders following jet injection.
Juxtaposing the Navy’s recommendation to the World Health Organization who gave a recommendation that 5% or less bleed within 30 seconds, signifies the Navy would like the threshold to be low and that it be permissible if a lot of soldier’s bled during jet injections.
For the Navy to request that it be acceptable for bleeding to occur after two seconds, demonstrates they must be under the impression that after two seconds the jet injector nozzle would have been removed from the patient’s skin and thus no longer pose a threat in transferring blood and infectious viruses. If this was their line-of-thought, it would show two errors: First, the Navy was not abiding by the manufacturers instructions to hold the jet injector upon the patient’s skin for three seconds following the injection. Otherwise, if the Navy did hold the jet injector in place for a full three seconds and they also reported bleeding at the injection site after two seconds, would grossly implicate that the jet injector was contaminated with blood.
Second, the Navy was only deeming the presence of visible blood as a threat. They were ignorant to the inherent design faults that these jet injectors posed, whereby splash-back contaminated the jet injector nozzle, fluid suck-back (caused by the device being pressurized) literally sucked fluid and blood upon the nozzle orifice back into the internal fluid pathway and drug reservoir, and retrograde flow, whereupon the pressure within the newly constructed hole at the injection site created a reverse flow and fluid, commingled with blood and tissue fluid, exited the injection site and traversed against the jet stream and back into the nozzle orifice.
The Navy’s recommendation for the bleeding rate proves less than 5% of soldiers bled within two seconds. It can also be inferred that more than 5% of soldiers bled after two seconds based upon the fact that the Navy did not make it their recommendation.
Regardless of how soon after an injection a vaccinee bled is a moot point. Subsequent research on jet injection has also shown the occurrence of pathogen transfer without any visible bleeding at the injection site (Brink et al, 1985; de Souza Brito, 1996; Kelly et al., 2008). Even when the Ped-O-Jet was used correctly, and incorrectly, in an unpublished Brazilian study, the device transferred enough blood to contain blood-borne pathogens despite delayed bleeding or the absence of visible bleeding at the injection site (Hoffman et al., unpublished).
- (Brink et al., 1985) Brink PRG, van Loon AM, Trommelen JCM, Gribnau FWJ, Smale-Novakova IRO. Virus transmission by subcutaneous jet injection. J Med Microbiol. December 1985; 20(3): 393-397.
- (de Souza Brito, 1996) de Souza Brito G. Multi dose jet injectors and safety aspects in Brazil. CDC & WHO Meeting on Jet Injectors. Atlanta, October 2-3, 1996. (communication paper).
- (Fields, 1996) Fields R. Participation in Meeting: Jet injectors for immunization; current practice and safety; improving designs for the future. WHO/CDC Meeting. Atlanta, GA. 2-3 October, 1996. Available at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABZ997.pdf.
- (Hoffman et al., unpublished) Hoffman PN, Abuknesha RA, Andrews NJ, Brito GS, Carrasco P, Weckx LY, Moia LJMP, Silva AEB, Lloyd J. A field trial of jet injector safety in Brazil. (unpublished).
- (Kelly et al., 2008) Kelly K, Loskutov A, Zehrung D, Puaa K, LaBarre P, Muller N, Guiqiang W, Ding H, Hu D, Blackwelder WC. Preventing contamination between injections with multi-use nozzle needle-free injectors: a safety trial. Vaccine (2008) 26, 1344-1352.