“Flu Inoculations Lead to AIDS Scare” in Military Installment

Jet Injectors = Jet Infectors

May 21, 2016

1995 Flu Inoculations Lead to AIDS Scare
On December 4, 1995, the Navy Times newspaper ran an article of an AIDS scare during a mass jet injector vaccination campaign amongst military personnel. An HIV-positive service member had mistakenly been allowed to receive a jet injection. Once realization of the gross mishap and the potential threat to all subsequent vaccinees the inoculation line came to a halt.

“They stopped the air-gun inoculations after they realized the infected individual had received his flu shot from one of the autinjection ‘jet guns’, instead of a sterile needle.”

The Navy Times correctly emphasizes “sterile needles,” and thus connotes that “jet guns” are not sterile. Hence, the reason for the ensuing scare.

However, the damage had already been done. Military personnel who received their flu shots immediately following the HIV-positive man, before the line was stopped, were now potentially infected themselves.

The CDC believes there is a risk of HIV transmission via jet injectors. This 1994 CDC report stated in regards to jet injections, “The potential risk of bloodborne-disease transmission would be greater when vaccinating persons at increased risk for bloodborne diseases such as HBV or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection because of behavioral or other risk factors.” [Note: It will be several more years before HCV emerged in medical warnings.]

However the DoD tried to obfuscate the damage that had been done.

“Firing Line: The Navy says the HIV virus can’t be transmitted through use of the autoinjection ‘jet gun,’” stated the Navy Times.

Although if this were true, the line would not have been halted. The actions of the military speak louder than the minimizing statements warding-off backlash and litigation.

This fact remains even more evident by Lt. Cmdr. John Singley’s statement. The spokesman for the Naval Reserve Force said, “The good news is we were doing everything by the book.” Herein is another lie. If everything was being done “by the book” an HIV-positive service member would have received his flu vaccination via a sterile needle and not a jet injector.

The statements of Lt. Cmdr. Singley are nothing more than a failed attempt at whitewashing government negligence within the free-press. However, the press always prevails. Evidence obliterates heresy.

Here is the article in its entirety:

Navy Times Newspaper
December 4, 1995

Flu Inoculations Lead to AIDS Scare

WASHINGTON—An AIDS scare ripped through New Orleans on Nov. 17 after an HIV-positive service member was found to have gone undetected through an inoculation line at the Naval Reserve Force headquarters. Navy corpsmen were administering flu shots with air guns and syringes to hundreds of active duty and active reserve members of all five services. But they stopped the air0gun inoculations after they realized the infected individual had received his flue shot from one of the autoinjection “jet guns”, instead of a sterile needle.

“We stopped using (the guns), the doctors reviewed the procedures being followed and interviewed the people using the guns,” Lt. Cmdr. John Singley, spokesman for the Naval Reserve Force. “The good news is we were doing everything by the book.”

There are no documented cases of HIV infection through the use of these guns, according to the Centers for Disease Control.

References:

  • (CDC, 1994) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. General Recommendations on Immunization: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 43:(RR-1):7–8, 1994.

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1962 – Eli Lilly Warns of Hepatitis Transmission Via Jet Injection

Jet Injectors = Jet Infectors

May 21, 2016

In 2005, Dr. Martin Friede led the Initiative for Vaccine Research at the World Health Organization. In this same year, during a FDA panel discussion evaluating the safety of jet injectors, Dr. Friede presented a review of the scientific literature. Most shockingly was a slide he presented capturing a 1962 influenza vaccine product insert by Eli Lilly & Company. From the minutes of the meeting comes a startling revelation about what researchers knew but more importantly when the knew it. Dr. Friede stated,

In 1962, though, Eli Lilly & Company, I’ll show you this in a moment, but on their inference of product insert, [sic] that bleeding could occur and that this would carry a risk of hepatitis, and that it recommended to the doctor that if blood was observed, then resterilization should be done (FDA, 2005).

Moreover, for all the skeptics, Dr. Friede stated a second time,

This is the product insert from the 1962 package from Eli Lilly and it states somewhere there under red lined that if bleeding does occur, and bleeding does occur sometimes with jet injection, then the nozzle should be resterilized. So there was recognition then that hepatitis B transmission could take place (FDA, 2005).

1962 Eli Lilly Product insert Jet injection

Eli Lilly stated special precautions should be taken for jet injectors. “Epidermal wheals and mild bleeding may occur occasionally after jet injection” (emphasis added). The product insert does not state bleeding occurred rarely or seldom but occurred occasionally. The word occasionally means infrequently, irregularly and occurs now and then and is distinguished separately on the frequency spectrum from the words rarely and seldom. Moreover, the product insert stated, “If the nozzle becomes contaminated with blood or serum, it should be replaced or resterilized before further use to prevent the transmission of serum hepatitis virus or other infectious agents from one person to another” (Eli Lilly & Co., 1962).
References:

  • (Eli Lilly & Co., 1962) Eli Lilly and Company. Influenza Virus Vaccine Polyvalent (Types A and B) [vaccine product insert; 03516, 80:12, PA 1787 AMP]. Indianapolis, IN: Eli Lilly and Company; December 28, 1962;102.
  • (FDA, 2005) FDA. General Hospital and Personal Use Devices Panel of the Medical Devices Advisory Committee. August 9, 2005. 35th Conference. Washington, D.C.

 

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Military Corpsmen Checked For Bleeders Following Jet Injections

Jet Injectors = Jet Infectors

May 21, 2016

U.S. Navy Medicine vol. 67, num. 12, Dec. 1976

In December 1976, the U.S. Navy Medicine newsletter ran a brief article for any military installments seeking to conduct mass jet injector vaccination campaigns to call-in a special team of corpsmen. The article, “Help Available For Mass Immunization Programs” put-out by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 5., sheds light on the military’s mass jet injector vaccination campaigns. As noted in the article:

  • “Jet Injector guns can immunize up to 700 people each hour, so arrange the schedule to allow as many people as possible to participate each minute.”
  • In creating a vaccination line allow for a 10-foot space before and after the jet injector. Meaning the only persons in close proximity to the jet injector were the vaccinator and the vaccinee. Therefore to contest any naysayers, there was no other medical staff in the immediate vicinity to cleanse the nozzle of the jet gun.
  • 10-feet following the jet injection was a corpsman checking for any bleeders.

Herein is evidence from a trained jet injector team that immediately following jet injections there was the presence of blood. With blood present the risk of transmitting blood-borne pathogens, such as hepatitis C, was also present.

Here is the article in its entirety:
US Navy Medicine- Help Available For Mass Immunization Programs 1US Navy Medicine- Help Available For Mass Immunization Programs 2
Help Available For Mass Immunization Programs

The Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 5 offers the services of a jet injector team for mass immunization against influenza, tetanus, cholera, typhoid, smallpox, and yellow fever. The jet injection apparatus has not been approved for use with booster plague vaccine or with tuberculin PPD.

Generally, the team should be called in only when at least 100 people are scheduled for immunization. Smaller commands are encouraged to coordinate their immunization programs with other ships and stations to create a large enough workload to justify the team’s visit.

Requests for the team’s services should be submitted at least 14 days before the date set for immunization. Send requests to: Officer in Charge, Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 5, Naval Station Box 143, San Diego, Calif. 92136. Or telephone (Area code 714) 235-1261/62/63/64; or Autovon 958-1261.

The following instructions must be followed to obtain maximum benefits from the jet injector team:

Jet Injector guns can immunize up to 700 people each hour, so arrange the schedule to allow as many people as possible to participate each minute. Do not schedule immunizations for a payday unless they can be given before pay is distributed. Before the jet injector team arrives, screen all personnel who have known allergies.
Provide easy entrance and exit to the immunization area. The following physical layout is recommended:

Entrance
Acetone prep station
10-foot space
Jet injector guns
10-foot space
Bleeder check station
Inoculation form container
Exit

The ship or station medical department should furnish the following personnel and supplies: a physician, who must be in the immediate vicinity; two hospital corpsmen—one to prep the arm, one to check for bleeders; sufficient immunization material; cotton swabs; acetone; Band-aids; an emergency tray.

 

 

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Ped-O-Jet Withdrawal Letter to DoD Over Risk of Disease Transmission

Jet Injectors = Jet Infectors

May 21, 2016

 

In a 1997 letter, Keystone Industries informed the Department of Defense of its intent to withdraw and stop manufacturing the Ped-O-Jet, the most widely used jet injector in the world, over risks of cross-contamination.

In 1996 and again in March 1997, the Center for Disease Control and the World Health Organization held a meeting to discuss the topic of mass inoculation. Many organizations and nations had representatives at these meetings. The Armed Services of the United States and FDA attended these meetings, as well as a Colonel Bancroft and other representatives of the Armed Services. In 1997, this group participated and was responsible for the development of a report entitled “Steering Group on the Development of Jet Injection for Immunization”. One of the topics in the report discussed the potential risk of blood borne disease transmission where a multiple use jet injector is used…as a result of these findings set forth in the report, we will discontinue producing and servicing the Ped-o-Jet at this time.

We believe that further studies would be required to ensure that the Ped-o-Jet is a safe method for administering mass injections. Until such studies conclude than no risk is present for blood borne disease transmission, we strongly urge the Armed Forces to discontinue use of the product” (Ped-O-Jet, 1997).

One interesting find is the manufacturer listed all military bases that had bought a Ped-O-Jet within the four years prior to the discontinuation.

Do not be dissuaded by the letter’s statement that “Ped-O-Jet has never had a reported case of cross contamination.” As I always state, actions speak louder than words. If the manufacturer was not concerned about cross-contamination then they would not have discontinued their device. Furthermore also take into account that other jet injector manufacturers redesigned their devices to eliminate the risks of cross contamination, for instance Bioject and their disposable-cartridge jet injector (DCJI) models. However, the owner’s of Ped-O-Jet consciously choose not to do this. Could it be to avoid being liable for a hazardous device? If Ped-O-Jet made a DCJI it would mean the company acknowledges their MUNJIs are hazardous.

Robert Harrington, once former CEO over the Ped-O-Jet before Keystone acquired it,
said at a FDA hearing,

[The letter] inform[ed] them [Department of Defense] that the product Ped-O-Jet was unsafe, could easily be contaminated, and that Keystone no longer would be responsible for the safety and efficacy of the product if it continued to be used by the government. The direct result of this letter was an immediate ban of all high workload jet injectors by the U.S. Department of Defense (FDA ,1999).

Here is the the withdrawal letter in its entirety –Keystone Industries Withdrawal Letter.

Note:

In November of 2015, after six years of searching and multiple Freedom of Information Act Requests to multiple DoD agencies, I finally found the withdrawal letter from the manufacturer/owner of the Ped-O-Jet to the DoD. (Previously other websites have wrongfully accredited my find and used this information without my consent. This FOIL Response Letter predates any postings by other websites and will clarify all matters as who is the correct promulgator).

References:

  • (FDA, 1999) Food and Drug Administration. General Hospital & Personal Use Devices panel: open session. Department of Health and Human Services Meeting. Rockville, MD. 2 August 1999.
  • (Ped-O-Jet, 1997) Ped-O-Jet withdrawal letter to Department of Defense. DPSC-970147. 1997.

 

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 6

May 21, 2016

Evidence of Incomplete Injections

Incomplete injections can be evidenced by large drops of vaccine remaining on the skin surface. The Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing states, this is an example of either “faulty maintenance, faulty operation or faulty injection technique.”

incomplete shots
(Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970)

This photograph shows vaccine running down a soldier’s arm from the wheal of a jet injection. Herein is photographic evidence that jet injectors were not administered properly.

fluid running down arm 1

fluid running down arm 2

fluid running down arm 3

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 7

Reference:

  • (Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970) Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing. Jet Hypodermic Injection Apparatus, Automatic. Department of the Army. November 1970. pp. 395-398.

 

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 5

May 21, 2016

Jet Injector Held At Incorrect Angle

Theses photographs capture corpsmen holding the jet injector at an incorrect angle. The Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing stated the jet injector must be placed upon the skin at a 90 degree angle otherwise the jet stream could lacerate the skin.

Place at a 90 degree angle
(Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970)

The jet injector must be pressed firmly yet evenly upon the patient’s skin.

Place evenly and firmly
(Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970)

Note the angle created from the vaccine’s arm and the jet injector does not create a 90 degree angle. Yellow lines have been added to demonstrate the angle is incorrect.

1965 Fort Dix inoculation 5
(Army Fort Dix, 1965)

1975 RTC Orlando Navy inoculation 5

(Navy RTC Orlando, 1975)

1976 Fort Jackson company D
(Army Fort Jackson company D, 1976)

Navy RTC Orlando 5

(Navy RTC Orlando)

Navy RTC Orlando 6
(Navy RTC Orlando)

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 6

Reference:

  • (Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970) Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing. Jet Hypodermic Injection Apparatus, Automatic. Department of the Army. November 1970. pp. 395-398.

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 4

May 21, 2016

Nozzles Were Not Wiped: No Medical Supplies To Wipe Nozzle

The nozzle of the jet injector was not wiped between vaccinations. This is evidenced in these photographs by the lack of medical supplies within the immediate vicinity of the vaccinator. There is no cotton or gauze swabs to clean the nozzle or a readily available container for discarding waste. In some photos the carrying case of the jet injector is the only visible equipment next to the vaccinator. Several of the photos capture the corpsmen’s conduct in between vaccinations. Rather than wipe the nozzle the corpsmen are standing idle while waiting for the next recruit to step forward.

Military mass immuniation

(unknown)

1966 Great Lakes NTC
(Navy Training Center Great Lakes, 1966)

1970 Marine Corp Recruit Depot San Diego
(Marine Corp Recruit Depot San Diego, 1970)

1981 Marine Corp Recruit Depot inoculation

(Marine Corp. Recruit Depot Parris Island, 1981)

1983 Great Lakes NTC Navy inoculation 3
(Navy Training Center Great Lakes, 1983)

Navy RTC Orlando 2

(Navy RTC Orlando)

Navy RTC 3

(Navy)

1981 Navy RTC company 236 - 2
(Navy RTC San Diego Company 236, 1981)

1965 Fort Dix 4
(Army Fort Dix, 1965)

1970 USN Great Lakes
(Navy Training Center Great Lakes, 1970)

1965 MCRD Parris Island Platoon 204- 1

(Marine Corp. Recruit Training Center Parris Island, 1965)

1965 MCRD Parris Island Platoon 204- 2
(Marine Corp. Recruit Training Center Parris Island, 1965)

1965 MCRD Parris Island Platoon 204- 4
(Marine Corp. Recruit Training Center Parris Island, 1965)

1965 MCRD Parris Island Platoon 204- 3

(Marine Corp. Recruit Training Center Parris Island, 1965)

Navy mass immunization
(Navy)

Navy RTC Great Lakes
(Navy RTC Great Lakes – photo courtesy of Great Lakes Navel Museum,

Great Lakes, Ill.)

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 5

 

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 3

May 21, 2016

Nozzles Were Not Wiped: Vaccinators Held a Ped-O-Jet in Each Hand

These photographs capture the corpsmen with a jet injector in each of their hands. Remember, in Mr. Harrington’s own words, “There’s nothing recorded in the world that says that it wasn’t wiped.” Unequivocally these photographs capture the nozzles of these jet injectors were not wiped as the corpsmen have a jet injector in each hand and no other medical staff are standing in their immediate vicinity to cleanse the nozzle.

Mr. Harrington, you are a liar!

Wiping the tip of the nozzle does not eliminate the risk of cross-contamination. In the natural process of jet injection the internal components of the gun become contaminated and cannot be sterilized by the wiping of external components. However, the CDC stated, “the potential risk for bloodborne-disease transmission can be substantially reduced by swabbing the stationary injector tip with alcohol or acetone after each injection” (CDC, 1994).

1965 Fort Dix

(Army Fort Dix, 1965)

military mass jet injector vaccination

(unknown)

1969 Fort Campbell company a
(Army Fort Campbell Company A, 1969)

1969 Fort Polk Company E

(Army Fort Polk Company E, 1969)

1969 Fort Campbell company a- 2
(Army Fort Campbell Company A, 1969)

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 4

References:

  • (CDC, 1994) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. General Recommendations on Immunization: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 43:(RR-1):7–8, 1994.

 

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 2

May 21, 2016

Patient’s Arm Was Not Supported / Flesh Was Not Pulled Tight

The Armed Forces gave a scrupulous description on how to administer vaccinations via jet injectors. In this 1970 Army Medical Department’s Handbook of Basic Nursing, the vaccinator is given explicit instructions with photos, as shown below. [Note: refer to pages 395-398 in the following link above on jet injection]

The vaccinator must support the patient’s arm while the vaccination is given. The flesh must be pulled tightly.

Pull flesh tight

(Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970)

However, no matter the branch or year of service corpsmen frequently failed to administer the vaccinations properly. These photographs capture corpsmen failing to pull patients’ skin tightly so that the injection would be properly received.

1968 Fort Dix Company D-3
(Army, Fort Dix, 1968, Company D-3)

1969 Fort Knox

(Army Fort Knox, 1969)

1975 RTC Orlando Navy inoculation

(Navy RTC Orlando, 1975)

1970 MCRD San Diego

(Marine Corps. Recruit Depot San Diego, 1970)

1968 Fort Knox

(Army Fort Knox, 1968)

1975 RTC Orlando Navy inoculation 2

(Navy RTC Orlando, 1975)

US Coast Guard
(Coast Guard)

The Army Medical Department’s 1970 Handbook of Basic Nursing stated, “Improper injection technique will injure the recipient’s skin.”

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 3

Reference:

  • (Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing, 1970) Army Medical Department Handbook of Basic Nursing. Jet Hypodermic Injection Apparatus, Automatic. Department of the Army. November 1970. pp. 395-398.

 

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Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 1

Jet Injectors = Jet Infectors

May 21, 2016

 

Monday, August 2, 1999
Rockville, Maryland

In a conference room within the Food and Drug Administration complex, a panel of health experts evaluated the safety of jet injector devices. Robert Harrington, president of American Jet Injector and former president of Vernitron Medical Products (the former owner of the Ped-O-Jet), speaks-out from the audience:

MR. HARRINGTON: Not necessarily. It was used by the Army for 35 years and it [the jet injector nozzle] was always wiped. Never had an issue. Good tracking system. And there’s nothing recorded in the world that says that it wasn’t wiped. It’s in a study that was presented using a method that isn’t approved, it was not wiped and it said oh, we can contaminate 31 out of 100.
MR. ULATOWSKI: You want to come up to the mike? Because that’s not getting transcribed.
DR. EDMISTON: Do you want to do that again?
MR. HARRINGTON: Sure. What I’m saying to you is we believe that there are situations–the U.S. military for 35 years used the product appropriately. There was never an indicated transmission of hepatitis. Certainly they follow cases of hepatitis in the U.S. military.

Robert Harrington’s statement caused an uproar amongst veterans. These men and women of valor experienced vaccinations first-hand. Yet here the president of the company that manufactured and sold the devices, who was not present for any of these mass vaccination campaigns of soldiers, purports safety procedures were always followed. His arrogance is overwhelming. His claims maddening!

Veterans can easily remember his or her military jet injector vaccinations. Many recalled seeing blood either on the nozzle of the device, upon his or her arm or a comrade’s arm, or all of the above. At the time of injection many felt uneasy that safety procedures were being disregarded. Many believed the process was carried-out hastily with a reckless lack of care and attention. And all have never forgotten the experience.
Over time, military vaccinations had taken on a level of notoriety. The medical procedure became one of the many fixtures of a soldier’s military experience. Military year books even captured recruits receiving these “Shots” in numerous photographs within each book. The photographs were almost intended to be a humorous recollection to some sort of right-of-passage. These photographs now represent an invaluable asset into how jet injector vaccinations were actually administered.

In the previous series, Faulty Design Created Inherent Risks, we learned the design features of these devices created inherent faults that permitted cross-contamination of blood and blood-borne pathogens. Therefore, it may seem moot to discuss anything further. To the contrary! Remember, if the jet injector was administered at an angle the jet stream would lacerate the skin and cause bleeding. This raises pertinent questions, such as: If jet injector procedures were not followed would blood contamination be more likely and occur more frequently? Would the problem be exacerbated and perpetual? In this series we will examine the mass vaccination campaigns of soldiers and how improper vaccination techniques increased the risk of blood contamination.

 

Table of Contents

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 2
Patient’s Arm Was Not Supported / Flesh Was Not Pulled Tight

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 3
Nozzles Were Not Wiped: Vaccinators Held a Ped-O-Jet in Each Hand

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 4
Nozzles Were Not Wiped: No Medical Supplies To Wipe Nozzle

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 5
Jet Injector Held At Incorrect Angle

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 6
Evidence of Incomplete Injections

Improper Military Jet Injector Vaccinations – Part 7
Conclusion

 

 

1970 MCRD San Diego Platoon 2099 shots

(Marine Corp. Recruit Training Depot San Diego Platoon 2099, 1970)

 

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